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AN EVALUATION OF THE EFFICACY OF THE 
NEGATIVE INCOME TAX PROPOSAL 
Introduction 
For the past 20 years, the cost of attempting to redistribute 
the income of Americans in order to reduce or eliminate poverty through 
our current system of public assistance has steadily increased. 
Exhibit I illustrates the increase in social welfare expenditures by 
both the federal government and state and local governments for the 
period 1960 to 1979. Total welfare expenditures increased from 
$52.3 billion in 1960 to $428.4 billion in 1979, an increase of 
719 percent. Federal spending for the same period rose from $25 billion 
to $264.2 billion, an increase of 956.8 percent. l This high cost is 
partially the result of inefficiency and a lack of coordination and 
control among the various public assistance programs at the federal 
and state levels. 
The present system also provides little or no incentives to work. 
This lack of work incentives contributes to the phenomenon of the 
cycle of poverty, whereby the reliance on public assistance is passed 
on from generation to generation. 
A review of the current system of social welfare, including a 
brief history of the antipoverty movement, provides insight into the 
problems which exist in this system of relief. This analysis strongly 
emphasizes the need for change. A Negative Income Tax plan is an 
approach to such a change which utilizes the federal tax system as a 
means of reducing or eliminating poverty. It consists of a negative 
_ _ 
~ ,..--..."~ 
$ 
Billions 
Soci,C!l W_~lfare ~xp~nditure13 Under Public Programs, 1960-1979 
600 
Totall Feder_ Sta~e 
-.
I~l ~5 
andGovt. ~ 
Local 

Govts. . 

400 
I ~ 
x 
;:J" 
.~ 
0" 
~. 
~ 
H 
300 
200 
100 
N 
3 

tax or subsidy paid to households whose incomes fall below a certain 
level. This subsidy is reduced as income is earned by a rate of 
less than 100 percent, thereby providing an incentive to work. Such 
a plan is designed to replace the traditional system of categorical 
monetary and in-kind income transfer programs. 
History of the Antipoverty Movement 
Poverty has always been a serious problem in America's society. 
How could a country so rich explain its vast number of poor? Since 
explanations consisted mainly of laziness and ignorance, these people 
were generally ignored, and the problems of the poor were swept neatly 
under the Congressional carpets. Strong lobbying, however, brought 
about the enactment of worker's compensation in 1908 and veterans' 
disability compensation in 1917. 2 Although these programs were designed 
to provide recompense to employees and veterans for injuries sustained 
in the line of duty rather than to combat poverty, they represent the 
beginning of an era characteristic of social responsibility. 
The need for public assistance peaked in 1929. Almost 50 percent 
of the United States population was thrust into poverty because of 
severely depressed economic conditions. However, it was not until 
1933 that President Franklin Roosevelt, in his New Deal, recognized the 
government's responsibility to improve the standard of living of all 
U.S. citizens. During this time of reconstruction, more than 35 
government agencies and policies were established to provide relief to the 
unemployed, to promote economic recovery, and to administer programs for 
political, economic and social reforms. Some of these policies and 
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agencies included: the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (which provided 
for a minimum wage for employees), the Agriculture Adjustment Adminis­
tration, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Farm Security 
Administration, the Federal Emergency Relief Administration, the 
Federal Security Agency (now the Department of Health and Human 
Services), the National Labor Relations Board, the Railroad Retirement 
Board, the Public Works Administration, the Resettlement Administration, 
the Social Security Board, the Tennessee Valley Authority, and the 
Works Progress Administration. Although most of these agencies were 
abolished by 1940, they demonstrate a clear change in political attitudes 
toward the poor and helpless. 
Social Insurance. Plans to provide social insurance were 
established during the Great Depression of 1929-1938. For example, the 
Old Age, Survivor's and Disability Insurance program, more commonly 
known as Social Security, was enacted in 1935. The OASDI program 
was not designed to provide benefits to those in need, but to those who 
had contributed financially to it and who met certain eligibility 
req u iremen ts . 
Other categorical programs, such as unemployment insurance (1935), 
railroad retirement plans (1937), and black lung benefits (1969), have 
been added to the list of social insurance programs which provide 
direct monetary benefits. 3 In 1965, the Social Security System 
was expanded to include t1edicare, which is a basic medical plan 
that provides hospitalization, nursing~home care, home nursing visits, 
and out-patient tests and diagnoses to those 65 and older. All elderly 
persons, regardless of financial need, are eligible for these benefits 
5 
dependent upon the covered worker's contributions. Benefits under 
Medicare are termed "in-kind" benefits, because no cash transfers are 
made. They are services which are provided by the government through 
both public and private health care facilities. 
Public Assistance (Welfare). During this era of the Great 
Depression, the federal government also recognized a responsibility 
to help those citizens whose income, if any, was so low they were 
unable to contribute to social insurance programs. Welfare, or 
public assistance, programs were established to help those who were 
ineligible for social insurance. Unlike social insurance programs, 
the focus of the public assistance programs was directed to those 
people in need. Categorical assistance programs, which provide cash 
payments to the poor, include veterans' pensions (1933) and Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children (1935).4 The 1972 amendment to the 
Social Security Act provided cash benefits through Supplemental 
Security Income, which incorporated prior programs for old age 
assistance, aid to the blind, and aid to the permanent and totally 
disabled. 5 
Public assistance is also provided on an in-kind basis. The 
Food Stamp Program, under the Department of Agriculture, began in 
1964. Food stamps are issued to qualified individuals in the form 
of vouchers with which to purchase food. Public housing assistance, 
which first began in 1937, is a program whereby local governments 
receive federal subsidies to acquire housing projects which are then 
rented to low-income families. These tenants pay approximately 25 
percent of their income for rent and the federal government assumes 
6 
the remainder of the rental price. 6 Medical services are provided 
to low-income individuals through Medicaid, established in 1965. 
Benefits under Medicaid are similar to those under the Medicare 
program; however, Medicaid services are provided on the sole basis 
of need rather than on the recipient's prior contributions. 
The War on Poverty. The 1950s was a decade of unprecedented 
economic growth for the United States. For the first time, many 
Americans realized a surplus of income. Sales of durable goods and 
luxuries were at a peak. However, this growth in the nation's Gross 
National Product did very little to provide relief for the millions 
of other Americans who were not a part of the labor force. A renewed 
interest in the poverty problem gained the attention of President 
John Kennedy. Just a month prior to his assassination in 1963, 
he was presented with a document entitled "Program for a Concerted 
Assault on Poverty." A few months later in his 1964 State of the 
Union Address, President Lyndon Johnson declared a war on poverty. 
Within eight months, the President signed into law the Economic 
Opportunity Act and established the Office of Economic Opportunity 
to administer a number of programs designed to eliminate poverty 
entirely.7 
The OEO, later reorganized and renamed the Community Services 
Administration, provided funding for administrative expenses involved 
with the operation of locally community action agencies. State, local 
and private contributions, a portion of which were in-kind services, 
covered the remainder of the agencies' costs. The OEO established 
community action agencies to serve as umbrella agencies for a number 
~ 
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of antipoverty programs, such as neighborhood health services, legal 
services, lunch programs and home weatherization. 8 CAA's frequently 
service Head Start Programs which are under the direction of the 
Department of Health and Human Services. Head Start provides 
just what its name implies: an opportunity for preschool aged 
children of poor families to get a head start by preparing them 
for public school through emphasis on academic activities. 9 
After World War II the federal and state governments created 
or reestablished programs to provide training and vocational 
counseling for the poor. Many states revived their employment agencies 
during the 1950s and 1960s. The Job Corps prepared 16 to 21 year 
old high school drop-outs from very poor families for employment. 
The Neighborhood Youth Corps, under the direction of the Department 
of Labor, also provided training and part-time job opportunities for 
disadvantaged school drop-outs to age 21. Congress passed the Emergency 
Employment Act of 1971 seeking to create new jobs within communities 
for the unemployed. This program was later incorporated into the 
Comprehensive Employment and Training Act of 1973 (CETA), which 
operated through revenue sharing, where state and local governments 
match the funds provided by the federal government. 10 
Causes of Welfare Problems 
Lack of coordination. Only a handful of federal assistance programs 
designed to eliminate poverty or at least to alleviate its effects 
has been mentioned. A complete list of income transfer or support 
programs would prove to be too lengthy to write and too monotonous 
to read. A study by the Institute for Socioeconomic Studies revealed 
8 
" 

that 182 categorical federal income support programs were in existence 
during the fiscal year 1977. 11 
A major problem with our current system of providing assistance 
on a categorical basis is that it is often difficult to fit people 
into categories. Each program pays benefits to individuals or families 
who meet certain eligibility requirements, and because of the lack 
of coordination among the programs, requirements often overlap 
allowing individuals to qualify for several different programs and to 
receive more gross income than was intended. An example of such a 
situation was the discovery of a woman with three children who received, 
in addition to her monthly earnings, benefits from AFDC, public housing, 
surplus commodities, child care, school lunch assistance and Medicaid. 
Her total income was $678 per month. At that time, a working woman 
receiving no benefits would have had to earn more than $800 a month 
to receive the same net income, and the average salary for a woman 
was only $500 per month. I2 
Requirements for these categorical programs can, and very often 
do, conflict with each other, and people in need must give up benefits 
from one program in order to qualify for another. A 56 year old man 
receiving Social Security payments was given a $14 per month increase 
in benefits. That small increase caused him to lose his eligibility 
for Medicaid, caused the cost of his food stamps and the cost of his 
subsidized housing to rise, and resulted in a reduction in the payments 
he received from his veterans' pension. In the end, the man lost far 
more per month than the $14 increase in Social Security benefits. I3 
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The inability of the different programs to coordinate their 
efforts with each other also leads to waste. A young girl had acquired 
a rare and incurable illness in which her throat muscles became 
paralyzed. She was unable to speak and could survive only on a 
special diet of liquid food which cost $4 a day. Her mother 
received Social Security survivors' benefits, and the government's 
assistance of $4 per day for treatment would cause the family's income to 
increase to the point where the daughter could not collect her 
monthly allotment. Because the fa~ily could not afford to lose this 
income, the solution was for the girl to remain in the hospital. 
Therefore, it cost the government $135 per day for $4 worth of food. 14 
Cost. The complexity of our categorical welfare system and the 
lack of coordination has led to increased inefficiency and exhorbitant 
costs of administering the myriad public assistance programs . The cost 
to taxpayers for employing hundreds of thousands of people to help 
determine eligibility, ensure the receipt of proper benefits, and to 
check against fraud was almost $2 billion in 1977 just for AFDC, food 
stamps, Medicaid and CETA. These administrative costs are, of course, 
in addition to the benefits paid to recipients. The total cost of 
administering the 182 different categorical income transfer programs 
and the delivery of benefits was approximately $248 billion for 
fiscal year 1977, or 69 percent of the federal tax receipts. About $35 
billion of this amount was in the form of tax relief which is a form 
of income support to specific groups and, therefore, a cost or loss 
of revenue to the government. In addition to the federal assistance, 
state and local governments spent an additional $50 billion on support 
15services and payments during this same year. 
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Fraud, error and abuse. A further result of the complexity and 
inefficient administration of our current system is the amount of 
money lost each year to fraud, error and abuse. In 1978, Joseph 
Califano, Jr., the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, 
estimated this loss to be approximately 10 percent per year of the 
two largest programs administered by HEW, AFDC and Medicaid. This 
amounts to well over $1 billion for each program. 16 A large portion 
of this cost is a result of errors on the part of local welfare 
offices in the processing of claims. Their failure to detect false 
statements from recipients or their inability to follow up on the 
information given has led to payments to applicants who are not 
eligible and to overpayments to qualified individuals. 
In addition to false claims by recipients, the current method by 
which our Medicaid system is administered is an -open invitation to 
abuse and fraudulent claims by physicians and pharmacists. Mr. Califano 
reported that phYSicians have "claimed to have performed more than 
one appendectomy on the same person, or . . . six tons ill ectorni es 
on the same individual in a year. Other cases involve women who have 
supposedly given birth three times in the same year, or doctors who 
list 70 house calls to the same address in a year."ll It has also 
been found that pharmacists can easily bill Medicaid for false or 
nonexistent prescriptions. 18 
The program reported to have more incidents of fraud and abuse than 
any other area of public assistance is the Food Stamp Program. In a 
recent telephone conversation with a representative of the Food and 
Nutrition Service of the Department of Agriculture, the administering 
11 
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agency of the Food Stamp Program, he admitted that fraud, abuse 
and errors do exist and are problem areas. However, he supplied no 
accurate data. The agency strongly feels that the publicized 
reports concerning fraudulent misuse and counterfeiting of food stamp 
coupons are greatly "sensationalized.,,19 Because accurate data is 
unavailable on the subject of welfare fraud, it cannot be determined 
whether this issue has been overstated by media reports or whether 
the administering agencies are understating the extent of the 
dollars lost or both. 
Although administering agencies of public assistance are aware 
of the loss each year due to fraud, error and abuse, the unwieldy 
size of the welfare bureaucracy renders it almost impossible to 
control fraud at the federal level . However, a concerted effort has 
been made by state and local governments to bring offenders to 
justice. Authorities in Los Angeles discovered that a woman had 
received $240,000 in welfare payments by claiming 66 nonexistent 
children for more than six years. A graduate student in Chicago was 
found to have collected $150,000 in illegal payments from 1972 to 
1978. A Cook County (Chicago) special task force prosecuted in 
only two years 335 cases of welfare fraud which involved a total of 
more than $3 million. 20 
Disincentives. Our current system of providing assistance to 
the poor is also plagued with massive economic costs resulting from 
the system's built-in work disincentives. As money is earned, welfare 
payments are reduced and often eliminated. For example, a family 
who earns $1,000 in income may see its food subsidy reduced by $200, 
12 
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its AFDC payments decreased by $450, and its public housing assistance 
reduced by $250. The net effect of the $1,000 in earnings is only 
$100 of additional income . It hardly seems worth the effort to seek 
work and be productive when one can stay home and be almost as well 
off. Often the implicit tax, or the sum of the benefits lost for 
each additional dollar of income earned, is greater than 100 percent. 
Therefore, working would make the individuals actually worse off 
financially than if they did not work and continued to live on 
government subsidies. 
In addition to providing disincentives to work, our current 
system also contributes to social disincentives. Most assistance 
programs provide benefits based upon the number of dependents in the 
family. It is sometimes, therefore, beneficial to have more children 
as a means to receive additional assistance. The traditional system 
of public assistance also relies on the categorization of recipients 
into specific groups. People will often alter--or pretend to alter-­
their situations to fit into the categories. According to the 
Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress, AFDC 
discriminates against fully employed fathers. They are ineligible 
for aid regardless of their income level. Such discrimination provides 
a potential financial incentive for families to break up.21 
Welfare problems in review. The preceding examples and 
statistics are not intended to imply that our current public 
assistance programs have been completely ineffective. The number 
of families who live below the poverty line has decreased from almost 
50 percent in 1929 to 22 percent in 1960 to 11 percent in 1980. 22 
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The economic and social costs of bureaucratic inefficiencies, however, 
have increased at alarming rates. For the past two decades, members 
of the labor force who work to support these programs with their 
tax dollars have criticized the welfare system and have demanded 
reform. Several methods of restructure have been proposed which 
attempt to achieve three objectives: to eliminate poverty; to 
preserve work incentives as much as possible; and to maintain equity 
by allowing for a greater total income for those who earn higher 
incomes through work effort. 23 
A guaranteed income. A conflict exists, however, in attempting 
to achieve these three goals, regardless of the method employed. 
To equitably remove or mitigate poverty requires the adoption of 
a direct government guaranteed minimum income. Theoretically, such 
a plan would raise the income of all poor families to an income set 
at the poverty level at a cost of less than one percent of the 
Gross National Product, substantially less than the cost of our 
current welfare programs. 24 However, a trade-off between the equity 
and the efficiency of a guaranteed minimum income arises because of 
the adverse incentives built into such a plan for both those taxpayers 
who pay the subsidy and those at the bottom of the income ladder 
who receive the subsidy. Such adverse incentives lead to economic 
waste, and they could increase the cost of such a program to the 
unacceptable level of over $500 billion. 25 
For example, the establishment of a guaranteed income would 
undoubtedly require a higher tax rate to be levied on the labor force 
whose earnings are above this minimum level in order to finance the plan. 
,. 
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Although this increase in taxes will make working less attractive 
by reducing the net income, it will also make working more necessary 
in order for the family to maintain its spending level. Such high 
taxes do, however, encourage the search for additional tax loopholes, 
or socially unproductive methods to reduce the tax liability. 
According to economist Arthur Okun, "High tax rates are followed 
by attempts of ingenious men to beat them, as surely as snow is 
follo'.',ed by little boys on sleds.,,26 
The greatest amount of inefficiency or waste of such a plan 
is perhaps due to the adverse incentives to work for those families 
whose income is below the poverty level. Exhibit II graphically 
illustrates the effects on the labor supply at a guaranteed minimum 
income level of $7,000. Family X, shown on the vertical line OA, 
would receive the full amount of the subsidy of $7,000. Family Y 
whose income is $5,000 would receive a subsidy of $2,000 which would 
bring it up to the guaranteed minimum income level. Why, then, should 
this family work and earn $5,000 when it can receive the full amount 
of $7,000 with no work effort at all? The implicit tax rate (the 
amount by which the subsidy is reduced for each additional dollar 
of earned income) for this type of assistance plan is 100 percent. 
In this manner, a guaranteed minimum income plan fails to reach the 
goals of providing work incentives and of maintaining equity.27 
Further, Family Z, a nonpoor family earning $8,000 per year, 
will also leave the workforce and reduce its income only slightly 
($1,000, less the required amount of income taxes). A guaranteed 
minimum income plan would therefore be equitable and efficient ~ if 
people continue to work as much after the subsidy as they worked previously.28 
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Another approach to the redistribution of income is the 
negative income tax plan. The proposal is a modification of the 
guaranteed minimum income plan into which work incentives are 
provided. 
The Negative Income Tax Plan 
History of the negative income tax concept. The process of 
negative income taxation is not a new concept. It was first debated 
in England in the 1930s and later discussed informally by members of the 
U.S. Treasury Department's Tax Research Division in the mid 1940s. 
Conservative economist Milton Friedman presented a formal proposal 
of a negative income tax plan in a lecture in 1956. He later 
expanded his views in Capitalism and Freedom in 1962. 29 
Negative income tax structure. Like the guaranteed minimum 
income plan, the principle of a negative income tax is to extend 
the income tax rates beyond zero to a negative level in order to 
provide assistance to low income families. In other words, families 
whose income falls below a given level receive a subsidy or negative 
tax rather than paying a positive income tax and receiving welfare 
payments simultaneously. Exhibit III illustrates a hypothetical model 
of such a system of taxation. 
The 45 degree line, OBD, represents net income if no taxes are 
paid and no subsidy is received. On this line, a family who earns 
a gross income of $5,000 will have a net or take-home income of $5,000. 
The basic elements of a negative income tax plan are: a guaranteed 
minimum income level; a marginal tax rate; and a "critical income 
level. II 
17Exhibit III 
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The guaranteed minimum level is the amount of income every 
family is guaranteed, whether or not a household ~ember is employed. 
This level is set at $7,500 in Exhibit 111. 30 
A marginal tax rate is the amount of tax that is paid on 
each additional dollar of income. In reference to a negative income 
tax plan, this tax rate may also be called the "take-back" rate, 
because it represents the amount by which the negative tax or 
subsidy is reduced for each additional dollar of earned income. 
Such a tax rate determines the slope of the "income after negative 
income tax" line, ABC. The marginal tax rate in the example in 
Exhibit III is 33 1/3 percent. For every $300 of income earned. the 
negative tax is reduced by only $100. allowing the family to keep 
$200. Obviously, the more a family earns by working, the more 
income it will keep. 
The third element of a negative income tax plan is the "critical 
income level. II It is the level of income at which no tax is paid 
nor subsidy received. This income level is also referred to as the 
break-even point. The model in Exhibit III establishes the break­
even point at an income level of $22,500. 
In Exhibit III, a family of four with no earned income would 
receive the maximum subsidy or negative tax of $7,500, such as 
Family X. Moving to the right on the earned income before tax or 
subsidy axis, a family which enters the workforce and earns $6,000 
would receive, after the subsidy of $5,500 (a reduction of $1,000 
for each $3,000 earned), a total income of $11,500. Family Y, which 
has an earned income of $15,000, would still receive a negative tax 
19 

of $2,500 for an income-after-tax of $17,500. An earned income of 
$22,500 would provide no subsidy, and any income above $22,500 would 
produce a positive tax, as is characteristic of our current system 
of taxation. For example, employing a one-third marginal tax 
rate, Family Z with an earned income of $30,000 would be required 
to pay a positive tax of $2,500 (one-third of the difference between 
the break-even level of $22,500 and the earned income of $30,000). 
Exhibit IV presents a table showing subsidy and tax amounts at 
various income levels. 
Variations of a negative income tax plan. The plan shown in 
Exhibit III would be modified to reduce its cost by simply changing 
either the minimum income level or the marginal tax rate, or both. 
For example, Exhibit V illustrates a plan with the same $7,500 
minimum income level, but the marginal tax rate has been increased 
to 50 percent. In this model, the break-even or critical income 
level is now $15,000. It is important for the reader to understand 
that any increase in the marginal tax rate would reduce the incentive 
to work. A 50 percent marginal tax rate, as depicted in Exhibit V, 
would mean that, for each dollar earned, the negative tax would be 
reduced by 50 cents, as opposed to the 33 cents reduction in Exhibit III. 
In addition to creating more work disincentives, a 50 percent implicit 
tax rate on incomes less than $15,000 would require a regular tax of 
50 percent on incomes above $15,000, if a proportional tax structure 
is maintained as illustrated in Exhibits III and V. 
Because one purpose of the negative income tax plan is to 
eliminate as many of the current social programs as possible, one must 
be cautious when reducing the plan's guaranteed minimum income level 
20 
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to achieve lower costs. If this level is set too low, more assistance 
programs would undoubtedly have to be re-established, adding greatly to 
the cost of a negative income tax plan. On the other hand, a 
guaranteed minimum income level set too high would also produce 
even greater work disincentives. 
In Labo~ Theory, Richard Perlman describes two alternative 
negative income tax plans. Rather than maintaining a constant 
or proportional tax rate, as seen in Exhibits III and V, he studies 
the effects of both a progressive and regressive tax rate. 
When the marginal tax rate is progressive, or increasing, 
the negative tax received is reduced by greater rates as the family's 
earned income increases. While this type of negative income tax 
plan provides for increased income for increased work effort, 
additional dollars earned are taxed at a higher rate. At this 
point, when each additional dollar earned is worth less, the worker 
is motivated to reduce his hours of work. He realizes that he is 
assured of recei vi ng some income whether he vlOrks or not and 
thereby depresses his supply of labor. 31 
In another hypothetical model, Perlman discusses a regressive, 
or decreasing, marginal tax rate. In this plan, the decrease in 
the negative tax is related to the supply of labor, allowing for 
greater increases to total income as more labor is supplied. In 
other words, the plan has stronger work incentives because the 
negative tax is reduced in smaller increments the more hours of 
labor supplied. Perlman says of this plan: 
23 

On the surface, it appears that /ihis plan/ might 
have a ive quality. It may seem contrary to 
purpose an antipoverty program to grant larger 
subsidies to higher incomes, as wou1d the case under 
this plan. But closer examination reveals the 
higher subsi is not ng to workers with higher 
earnings potentia1, but as a reward to the same 
worker for more effort. maximum attainable subs; 
declines with rising full-schedule income, thereby 
retaining the progressive nature of the tax structure. 32 
though a sive marginal tax rate would preserve work 
incen ves by making a full work le more attractive, such a 
ve income plan would present admi s ve problems and 
would prove very costly. 
A more feasible alternative. After evaluating several variations 
of a negative income tax plan, I believe the most ible alternative 
is a combination of plans. Exhibit VI illustrates the 
dimensions such a proposal. The guaranteed nimum income level 
is at $7,600 for a nonfarm family of four, and the marginal 
tax rate is established at proportional rate 40 percent up 
to the k-even int of $19,000. This portion of plan is 
similar in structure to those shown in Exhibi III and V. However, 
earnings ved the break-even point would be at ressive 
or increasing For example, a family whose earnings are $20,000 may 
taxed at a of 40 percent. Earnings $30,000 may subject 
to a percent marginal tax rate. The tax rate for earnings between 
$40,000 and $50,000 may be percent, and so on. The increasing tax 
rates above the brea point cause sl income after 
negative income tax to begin decreasing. Net income is s 11 increasing, 
a lthough it is" i ncreas i ng i ng rates. II 
24Exhibit VI 
Negative Income Tax Plan 
with a guaranteed minimum income of 
$7,600 and a 40 percent marginal tax 
rate to the break-even point of $19,000; 
thereafter the marginal tax rate . is 
progressive. 
30,000 
,, 
, '" '" ,...... 
(J)­
'-" 25, 000 
~ 
H 

Vl 

I:Q 
:::> 
(/) 
~ 
o 

20,000 

( 
.~ 
H 
.-~ 15,000 
j:zl 

H 

< 
~ 
~ 
~ . 
o 
u 
Z 

H 10,000 

7,600 
5,000 
10,000 15,000 20,000 25,000 30,0005,000 

( 

INCOME BEFORE TAX OR SUBSIDY ($) 
25 
At some income level, the marginal tax rate will aqain become 
proportional or constant. The current system of taxation in the 
Un; States is similar in structure to that this proposal 
in its proGressive nature. 
This negative income tax proposal would ace all the 
current wel programs, with the exception of the social insurance 
programs, such as Social Security, ~1edicare, workers' compensation 
and other rement and dis lity plans that require monetary 
contributions by the pient. lly, at such a me when 
it is no longer sel supporting, Social ty could integrated 
into this system. Until that time, the guaranteed minimum income 
level would be adjus downward for households receiving Social 
Securi ty ts. 
The income would also ire adjustment based upon 
geographic locations. For example, a guaranteed minimum income 
of $7,600 would not prov; same level of assistance for a 
family in New York City as it would for a family living in rural 
North Carolina. 
The unadjusted cost of this proposal would approximately 
$150 billion. total cost of public assistance and insurance 
programs would require the addition the costs of any additional 
programs which would be maintained, such as Social Security. 
While the estimated cost gures r to high, I believe that 
a negative income plan such as the one proposed in Exhibit VI could 
be impl at a total cost of less than the amount currently being 
nt on social welfare programs, especially if Social Security were 
to be incorporated into it. 
• 
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An evaluation of a negative income tax plan. In 1962, Milton 
Friedman commented on his proposal of a negative income tax plan 
in Capitalism and Freedom: 
The advantages of this arrangement are clear! It is 

directed specifically at the problem of poverty. It gives 

help in the form most useful to the individual, namely 

cash. It is general and could be substituted for the 

host of special measures now in effect. It makes explicit 

the cost borne by society. It operates outside the 

market. Like any other measures to alleviate poverty, it 

reduces the incentives of those helped to help themselves, 

but it does not eliminate that incentive entirely, as a 

system of supplementing incomes up to some fixed mlnlmum 

would. An extra dollar earned always means more money 

available for expenditure. 33 

However, like any proposed full-scale change in an established 
tradition, the negative income tax has received several criticisms, 
many of which are valid. For example, many fear that a negative 
income tax would become merely a supplement to the existing social 
welfare programs rather than a replacement for them. The purpose of 
a negative income tax plan is to replace all or a major portion of 
our current assistance programs both equitably and efficiently. As 
a supplemental program, the negative income tax would create an 
additional expense for the taxpayer rather than easing his current 
burden. 
Some legislators criticize the negative income tax for providing 
assistance for the undeserving. They feel it fails to recognize 
the reasons behind the lack of income, because such a plan would 
transfer income to all poor families whose income is below a certain 
level. Many families are poor because of problems with alcoholism, drugs, 
general self-discipline, family instability and shortsightedness. 
Cash payments to these individuals may only contribute to these 
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,; 
problems. By transferring money to the so-called undeserving poor, 
the children, to whom assistance is intended, would not benefit. 34 
However, many of these problems or conditions are the results of 
poverty. In these instances, payments of cash benefits may help 
the victims overcome their problems. 
Experiments testing the effects of a negative income tax 
plan on families were conducted for three and five years in Seattle 
and Denver, respectively, concluding in 1978. The results of 
these experiments indicated an unexpected increase in marital 
dissolutions. 35 The reason for these results may be the fact 
that the guaranteed income would be distributed to households 
rather than to individuals. Upon the dissolution of a marriage, 
each household would then be eligible for an independent income. 
Therefore, it would be unnecessary for a wife to be dependent on 
the husband or for a husband to remain within the family to provide 
support. 
Another criticism of the negative income tax plan is that the 
cost would not only include the payments to those families whose 
income is below the break-even point, but also the loss of tax 
revenue the government would have received from these families whose 
incomes are between the poverty level and the established break-even 
point. As noted previously, the break-even point could be adjusted 
downward by either increasing the marginal tax rate or reducing 
the guaranteed minimum income or both. 
Despite the drawbacks of a negative income tax plan, some of 
which are typical of existing programs, the advantages of such 
a program appear obvious. It would alleviate poverty by equitably 
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guaranteeing a minimum income to all poor families, rather than 
to those who are a part of specia1 interest groups, such as farmers, 
female heads of households, elderly persons, and small businessmen. 
Such a plan would replace all or a great number of our current 
income transfer programs at a reduced cost. The negative income tax 
plan could be administered through a single agency, the Internal 
Revenue Service, which should reduce administrative costs 
significantly. 
One can expect a slight reduction in labor supply, because, 
at the lower income levels, a worker can cut back his hours of work 
and still have more income than he had prior to the establishment 
of the negative income tax plan. However, the built-in incentives 
to work provide that those who do work will be in a position 
superior to those who choose not to work. Experiments have shown 
that, while some elect to reduce their work effort, more young adults 
from poor families graduated from high school, and personal 
expenditures increased in the areas of housing and medical services. 36 
Conclusion 
With the continued increase in government spending and the 
resultant mounting federal deficit, legislators must closely and 
objectively examine the possible alternatives to eliminate poverty. 
One alternative would be for the government to divest itself of social 
responsibilities and accept Darwin's philosophy that the strong will 
survive. Although this course of action would eliminate billions of 
dollars in government spending, it would be unacceptable to legislators 
and the public alike. After decades of providing assistance to the 
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less fortunate, we could not completely withdraw support. The 
American conscience would not allow it. 
Another alternative to eliminate poverty is to maintain our 
current methods of income transfer. I have examined the 
efficiencies and effectiveness of our existing welfare system. Is it 
providing a cure for the ailment of poverty, or is it merely 
relieving its symptoms? And how effective is it at relieving these 
symptoms? Even with the constant increase in spending, the United 
States is experiencing a slight increase in its number of poor 
families, and the distribution of income has not changed substantially. 
Serious problems were detected in our federal assistance programs 
when Milton Friedman and others proposed a negative income tax 
over 20 years ago. Since that time, the problems have multiplied 
with the creation of new programs, many of which overlap with 
others and produce a waste that taxpayers feel they no longer 
can nor should bear. 
One inherent philosophy of the American people, however, is 
to help those who will help themselves. Of course, there will 
always be indigents who are physically or mentally incapable of 
any type of self support, and society cannot and should not allow 
them to suffer. No citizen wants to see anyone starve to death 
because he cannot afford to buy food. It is unacceptable to allow 
children to suffer from malnutrition and diseases related to 
inadequate living conditions. No one should have to endure physical 
pain or die because he cannot bear the cost of medical help. Our 
welfare programs were designed to provide assistance to people in 
need; however it has done very little to motivate them to help 
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themselves. It has encouraged dependence on government aid and 
has actually contributed to the establishment of a welfare culture, 
where this dependency is passed on to future generations. 
A third alternative and possibly the only viable solution 
to the problems associated with our current public assistance 
programs is the development of a new system which would necessitate 
the dismantling of the existing myriad welfare programs and which 
would provide a method of equitably and efficiently reducing or 
eliminating the causes of poverty in the United States. I believe 
a variation of a negative income tax plan, such as the model 
proposed in Exhibit VI, may provide for such a system. This 
proposal would more efficiently and effectively achieve the 
objectives essential to the success of any plan to provide 
public assistance. It would eliminate poverty; it would 
provide for incentives to work; and it would maintain equity 
by allowing those who work to receive a larger total income than 
those who rely solely on government support. 
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